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PHOSPHATE DETERGENT REGULATIONS
I. Tm PHOSPHATE POLLUTION PROBLEM
Environmentalists are concerned that our bodies of water are
aging at a rate faster than normal, because of the introduction of
man-made nutrients, particularly phosphorous and nitrogen.2 These
man-made nutrients cause the accelerated growth of blue-green algae
that depletes the oxygen levels in the water.3 Scientific attention has
focused on control of these man-made nutrients as a technique for
preventing the accelerated enrichment-aging process. 4 Environmen-
talists see the control of phosphorous, and phosphate detergents in
particular, as a solution;5 the producers of phosphate detergents, of
course, do not agree.6
A heated debate between environmentalists and the detergent in-
dustry has arisen over the proper course of action concerning phos-
phate detergents. Nevertheless, state and local governments have
begun to act to reduce the amounts of phosphorous in their waters
1. How Fast Are U.S. Lakes Aging and Why?, 7 ENVIRONMENTAL Sos. &
TECHNOLOGY 198 (1973).
2. Grundy, Strategies for Control of Man-Made Eutrophication, 5 ENVIRoN-
MENTAL SC. & TECHNOLOGY 1184 (1971). The article points out that the natural
aging process of water involves eutrophication: "Eutrophication is a natural
process which involves an increase in the biologic productivity of a body of
water as a result of nutrient enrichment from natural sources. Environmental
concern is for those instances where the natural aquatic growth processes are
accelerated or increased. Under man's influence, excessive amounts of nutrients
can enter an aquatic ecosystem, accelerating the eutrophication processes-this
is known as 'cultural eutrophication.'" Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The author expresses the view that phosphate detergents are unique
among consumer products as a source of nutrients: "Nationally they represent
about 5.5 billion lbs. annually, approximately 20 lbs. for every man, woman, and
child. The phosphate fraction amounts to 2.2 billion lbs. or 30-40% of all the
phosphorous entering the aquatic environment. The environmental implications
of such quantities cannot be discounted." Id. The author expresses the view
that phosphorous is considered the preferable nutrient for control. Id. at 1186;
see Note, Phosphates in Detergents: The Chicago-Type Ordinance and Other
Remedies, 40 U. GIN. L. REv. 548 (1971).
6. Phosphates in Detergents, supra note 5, at 551.
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by limiting phosphate levels in detergents.7 In Florida, Dade County
has restricted phosphate levels in detergents and is one of the few
areas that has withstood legal attempts by the detergent industry to
block enforcement of its phosphate detergent regulation. In 1973,
Florida joined other states in undertaking a national survey of lakes
and rivers designed to determine the causes of and solutions to the
accelerated aging process." The results of the survey may become
added ammunition for either the environmentalists or the industry.
II. PROHIBITION OF PHOsPHATE DE-TERGENTS:
THE DADE COUNTY APPROACH
Dade County enacted in 1967 the "Metropolitan Dade County
Pollution Control Ordinance" to specifically regulate and control all
activities which may pollute the air, water, soil, and property in the
county.9 Before the passage of the ordinance there was a loose con-
glomeration of pollution control legislation in the county. This ordi-
nance consolidated all such regulations under Chapter 24 of the Dade
County Code in order to facilitate more efficient operation and en-
forcement of the regulations. County officials also formally created
section 24-4310 which added to the countywide pollution control ordi-
nance a pre-existing detergent control regulation. This section called
for the prohibition of the sale, use, and possession of biologically
non-degradable (hard) detergents in Dade County." Until 1971, this
section represented the total extent of detergent regulation in the
county.
In 1971, Dade County, aware of the existing phosphate discharge
problem within its borders, enacted a new county ordinance12 to be
added to Chapter 24 of the Dade County Code. Section 24-44 initiated
county control over the sale and use of synthetic and phosphate
7. Grundy, supra note 2, at 1186. As of 1971, six states and 47 localities had
already passed legislation limiting phosphate levels in detergents with the ma-
jority restricting levels to 8.7% immediately, and to zero in 1972.
8. Eutrophication Survey, DEPARTMENT OF POLLUTION CONTROL OF FLORIDA-
NEWSLETTER (October 1972); How Fast Are U.S. Lakes Aging and Why?,
supra note 1.
9. Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 67-95 § 1, Dec. 19, 1967 (creating Chapter
24 of the DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE).
10. DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 24-43 (1967).
11. This definition does not include phosphate detergents.
12. Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 71-31 § 1, July 13, 1971 (adding § 24-44 to
DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE).
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detergents in Dade County utilizing a two-stage process which would
culminate in a complete ban on the sale and use of phosphate deter-
gents by 1972.13 This measure is considered the most restrictive of
its kind, and a working knowledge of its extent and character facil-
itates a more comprehensive understanding of other legislative efforts
in this field.
The first phase of the law was designed to regulate the amount
of phosphates entering waste water from each potential source. It
prohibited the sale or use of any synthetic detergent which con-
tained more than 8.7% phosphorous by weight after April 30, 1971.14
It further prohibited the sale or use of any synthetic detergent which
recommended a use level of the detergent containing more than
seven grams of phosphorous after April 30, 1971.15 Taken together,
these two requirements were to ensure that efforts to reduce the over-
all levels of phosphorous entering the waters through detergent waste
water would not be counteracted by high recommended use levels of
phosphate detergents.
Phase two of the ordinance, a complete ban on the sale and use of
phosphate detergents in Dade County, is characterized by the Florida
Department of Pollution Control as a zero phosphate rule.'- Spe-
cifically, phase two makes it unlawful to use, sell, or in any other
manner furnish any synthetic detergent or detergent containing
phosphorous after January 1, 1972.17 Phase two includes any deter-
gents manufactured for use in machine dishwashers, dairy equipment,
beverage equipment, food processing and industrial cleansing equip-
ment,-8 as well as laundry detergents.
To ensure compliance with the phosphate restrictions and to pro-
tect consumer interests, it was further required that manufacturers
of any household laundry detergent sold in Dade County have on
file with the pollution control office a current report listing all the
detergent's ingredients.- After January 1, 1972, all detergents sold
in Dade County must list on the package the percentage by weight
13. DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE ch. 24, § 24-44 (1971).
14. Id. § 24-44(3).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 24-44(4); Detergent Limitations Adopted, DEPARTMENT OF POLLU-
TION CONTROL OF FLORMA-NEWSLETTER (November-December 1972).
17. DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE ch. 24, § 24-44(4) (1971).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 24-44(6).
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of each of their ingredients.2 0 The ordinance was an attempt to pro-
tect consumers through the content and labeling regulations, while
allowing the industry time to comply with the ban without suffering
a severe financial hardship. Nevertheless, the manufacturers did not
view this ordinance as beneficial and attempted to enjoin its en-
forcement.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BAN APPROACH
In 1971, the Soap and Detergent Association initiated a federal suit
which sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance's phosphate
ban and labeling requirements were unconstitutional because they
constituted an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and re-
quested that their enforcement be enjoined. In Soap & Detergent As-
sociation v. Clark,21 the federal district court reacted favorably to
Dade County's pollution control efforts by concluding that plaintiff
Association had not met its heavy burden of showing irreparable
harm from enforcement and, therefore, was not entitled to an in-
junction.22 The court had balanced the purpose and intent of the
ordinance-the protection of the health and safety of county resi-
dents-against the alleged financial harm to plaintiffs. The result
of this balancing approach was the conclusion that the "scales are
strongly tipped in favor" of Dade County's legislative environ-
mental pronouncements. 23 Although the industry was able to show
some financial loss if enforcement was not enjoined, it was unable
to show, as it must, that there was a substantial likelihood the
ordinance would later be held unconstitutional.24 Relying on Supreme
Court precedent in Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago,
20. Id. § 24-44(2).
21. 330 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
22. Id. at 1223. The court stated and applied the rule followed by the courts
when preliminary injunctions are requested that plaintiffs are entitled to injunc-
tive relief only if they can show both that they will suffer irreparable harm if
an injunction is not issued, and that there is a substantial likelihood they will
prevail on the merits at a final hearing. Id. at 1219.
23. Id. at 1222. The court detailed the problem of cultural eutrophication in
Dade County's waters and the contribution of phosphate detergents to augmenta-
tion of this problem. Against the evidence introduced by the county's experts
to support its position, the court placed the testimony of the industry that it
would have to expend hundreds of thousands of dollars to comply, and its claim
that this would be wasted financial resources if the ordinance was later declared
unconstitutional. Id.
24. Id. at 1221.
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Rock Island & Pacific Railroad, 2  the court held that if there is
conflicting testimony as to the public health, safety, or welfare
purpose behind state legislation and the only burden on interstate
commerce is an increased cost to the "interstate commerce business-
man," the court should uphold the legislative determination. 26 Fur-
thermore, the court reasoned that the problem of water pollution,
like air pollution, is not subject to uniform national regulation but
is solely within the province of local units of government.27 The court
decided that no preliminary injunction could issue because plain-
tiffs had not shown the substantial likelihood of unconstitutionality
at final hearing.28 "In fact," stated the court, "based on the record
here made, it appears that the ordinance in all aspects will withstand
constitutional challenge."2 9 In effect, this federal court upheld the
total prohibition and package labeling approaches because it found
a rational connection between those measures and the proper exercise
of the police power in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of
the county's residents.
No appeal of this decision was taken concerning the phosphate
ban. Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association did appeal,
however, the decision upholding the labeling requirements of sec-
tion 24-44 of the Code.O Plaintiff argued that Congress had pre-
empted the field through the 1966 Amendments to the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act."' The Fifth Circuit agreed that the county
labeling provision was invalid.32 This decision did not affect the
validity of the phosphate ban provision of section 24-44.
25. 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
26. 330 F. Supp. at 1221, citing Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
27. 330 F. Supp. at 1222, citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of De-
troit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), where "the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of a Detroit smoke abatement ordinance which had as its sole aim the
elimination of air pollution to protect the health and enhance the cleanliness of
the local community. The court recognized that the problem of air pollution is
peculiarly a matter of state and local concern." 330 F. Supp. at 1222.
28. Id. at 1223.
29. Id.
30. Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Clark, No. 72-1791 (5th Cir. July 12,
1973).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1970).
32. Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Clark, No. 72-1791 at 6, 7 (5th Cir.
July 12, 1973).
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Other states and localities, including Florida, have initiated phos-
phate detergent regulation legislation. Some of these efforts have
been subjected to judicial review. The following presentation is not
intended to be exhaustive, but merely representative of other ap-
proaches to the problem.
IV. OTHER APPROACHES To PHOSPHATE REGULATION
Florida enacted legislation imposing statewide detergent controls
regulating the content and use levels of detergents. 3 3 A county or
locality may not enforce a local measure regulating detergents that
establishes less stringent controls than those imposed by the State
law.3 4 The standards of the State law are set by the Department of
Pollution Control of Florida pursuant to its delegated powers.H5
These rules established by the Department make it unlawful to sell
or use detergents containing more than 8.7% phosphorous by
weight.36 The State's intent is regulation of content levels rather
than prohibition and therefore is more limited than the Dade County
approach. Included in the State regulation is a prohibition of the
sale of detergents having recommended use levels more than seven
grams of phosphorous by weight.3 The purpose of both sections is to
ensure that phosphate levels in the use of the detergent do not nullify
the rule's intent of keeping down overall phosphate discharges in
waste water. The State law also provides exemptions to its control,
including detergents used for personal body cleansing and disin-
fectants, but not including household laundry, commercial laundry,
machine dishwashing and industrial cleaning detergents.33
The State law is therefore a regulation on the sale or furnishing
of detergents by phosphate content with an extensive list of excep-
tions. By comparison, Dade County's prohibition on sale and use
is a much stronger control device.39 Florida's law covers only the sale
33. FLA. STAT. § 403.061(26) (1971).
34. Id.
35. RULES OF STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF POLLUTION CONTROL ch.
17-14 (1972).
36. Id. ch. 17-14.03(1).
37. Id. ch. 17-14.03(2). The reader should recognize the fact that this stat-
utory regulation resembles phase one of the Dade County ordinance to the ex-
tent of its restriction on phosphate levels in detergents.
38. Id. ch. 17-14.04.
39. By the terms of FLA. STAT. § 403.061(26) (1971), since the Dade County
ordinance is "not less stringent than the state regulation," and is in fact a
stronger regulation, it is not pre-empted by the State law.
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or furnishing of phosphate detergents, but not their use. It may be
assumed that use coverage was intended. Nonetheless, this is a loop-
hole that could be eliminated by inserting the word "use" into the
implementing law and department rules.
Phosphate detergent controls are also utilized in New York, both
at the county and state levels. Erie County, New York, has enacted
Local Law No. 8-"A Local Law Prohibiting the Sale of Certain
Detergents Containing Phosphorous.."40 In essence, this law is iden-
tical to Dade County's legislation, but with the same loophole that
the Florida law contains, since it deals specifically only with the sale
of detergents. The county law initiates a two-phase atack on phos-
phate detergents. Phase one prohibits the sale of detergents contain-
ing more than 8.7% phosphorous by weight after April 30, 1971.41
Phase two prohibits the sale or furnishing of phosphate detergents
entirely after January 1, 1972.42 The law contains the legislative
finding that the discharge of phosphates is seriously polluting the
county's waters through fertilization of excessive algae growth 4 3 but
since the law covers only sale and not use of phosphate detergents,
individuals could import phosphate detergents from other localities
for their own use.
The State of New York has also launched a two-phase attack on
the problem, culminating in a statewide ban on the sale of phos-
phate detergents after June 1, 1973.- In one respect this law is
similar in approach to Dade County's ordinance: it is a phosphate
ban. It is a ban, however, only on the sale of household cleansing
prod ucts. 45 These two limitations may detract from its effectiveness.
The law contains specific exemptions to its controls, among which
are industrial cleansing products and other household uses.46
Judicial reaction to the Erie County law has been favorable. In
40. ERIE CouNTY, N.Y., LOCAL LAW 8 (1971).
41. Id. § 2a.
42 Id. § 2b.
43. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Erie County, 68 Misc. 2d 704, 705, 327 N.Y.S.2d
488, 490 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
44. N.Y. ENViRONMENTAL CONSERV. LAW § 35-0105(2) (McKinney 1972).
45. Id. § 35-0103(1).
46. Id. Uses not covered are those not included in the definition of household
cleansing product, including foods, drugs, cosmetics, insecticides, fungicides and
rodenticides or cleansing products used primarily in industrial manufacturing,
production and assembling processes.
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Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Erie County,47 plaintiff claimed that the
law represented an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce
and that it was pre-empted by the State law, and sought an injunction
against the law's enforcement.48 The court concluded that the dangers
to the health and safety of the county's residents far outweighed
plaintiff's claims of financial loss. 49 The constitutional arguments
raised by plaintiff were rejected entirely by the court, which relied
on and cited the discussion of Dade County's ordinance in the Soap
and Detergent Association case as authority to support its conclusion
that there was not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.60
Such reliance points out that there is some judicial acceptance of
the view that, where this type of legislation is concerned, local efforts
to protect the safety and welfare of its residents will not constitute
an unreasonable burden of interstate commerce.
In Chicago, however, a similar phosphate detergent ban was de-
clared unconstitutional by a federal district judge because he con-
sidered it an unreasonable interference with interstate commerce.5"
The suit was filed by representatives of the detergent manufacturers.62
The court stated that the "evidence is clear that a detergent made
with phosphate is a more effective cleaning agent than a nonphos-
phate detergent when used with Chicago's water, and it is not at all
harmful to the persons using it or wearing clothes or eating from
utensils washed with it." 3 The court continued, "the city cannot
interfere with interstate commerce merely for hortatory purposes to
influence other cities from discharging phosphates into Lake Mich-
igan."54
The Chicago approach, which was the first comprehensive treat-
ment of the detergent phosphate problem in the United States, pro-
47. 68 Misc. 2d 704, 327 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
48. Id. at 707, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
49. Id. at 705-06, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 491. The court also concluded that the
county law had not been pre-empted by the State law because it only pre-empted
local regulations enacted after June 1, 1971, and Erie County's law was in force
before this date.
50. Id.
51. Soap & Detergent Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 357 F. Supp. 44 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
52. The suit was filed by the Soap & Detergent Association, Proctor & Gamble
Co., FMC Corp., Monsanto Co., and Amway Corp. Id. at 45.
53. Id. at 47.
54. Id. at 50.
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vided for a two-stage phase-out of phosphates in detergents similar
to the Dade County plan.55 The first phase limited phosphate content
to 8.7%, while the second phase eliminated phosphates entirely.56
Chicago's law, however, also presented specific exemptions to its
regulations.57
CONCLUSION
Final resolution of the constitutionality of this type of phosphate
regulation must await determination by the United States Supreme
Court, since at the present time there exist two divergent views on
this issue at the lower federal court level.
The detergent industry argues that these local laws represent an
unreasonable burden on interestate commerce; that they are un-
workable because there exist no safe and effective alternatives or
substitutes to phosphates;58 that since phosphates are added to the
waterways through sources other than detergents, the only truly effec-
tive remedy is sewage treatment; and finally, that there is no con-
clusive proof that removal of phosphates will prevent the acceleration
of the aging process in local waters.59 At least one federal district
court now agrees.
On the other hand, localities and environmentalists assert that this
type of regulation represents a valid exercise of the police power be-
cause it is designed to improve water quality and therefore bears a
reasonable relationship to the protection of public health and wel-
fare. They argue that phosphates have been proven to accelerate the
natural aging process of local waters and that these laws are intended
to prevent this phenomenon with its consequent health and environ-
mental hazards. Since these arguments have also gained federal judi-
cial approval, Supreme Court determination is essential in order to
end speculation and doubt as to the legality of phosphate detergent
regulations.
Michael H. Lax
55. CHICAGo, ILL., CODE ch. 17, art. VII, §§ 17-7.1 to 17-7.4 (1971).
56. Id. § 17-7.3 (1971).
57. Id. Although the law exempted detergents used in machine dishwashers,
dairy equipment, beverage equipment, food processing equipment and industrial
cleaning equipment, these exemptions applied only during the first phase.
58. Grundy, supra note 2, at 1186; where the view is expressed that this is
an exceedingly important factor to consider since experts in and out of the
industry have expressed concern that the phosphate substitutes may present
more potential human health hazards than the phosphates themselves.
59. Phosphates in Detergents, supra note 5, at 552.
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